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A R T I C L E S

Institutional Investors in the UK
and “Carbon-Major” Companies:
Private Environmental Governance
Post-Paris Agreement
Lisa Benjamin*

C

limate change poses a number of risks to institutional
investors across several categories, including physical,
financial, and regulatory. These risks are particularly acute for investors in “carbon-major” energy companies,
where fossil fuel reserves could become stranded assets given
the new global temperature goals agreed in the Paris Agreement.1 In the United Kingdom, leading energy companies
such as Royal Dutch Shell are listed on the London Stock
Exchange, and UK pension funds are heavily invested in
fossil fuel companies.2 The risks of climate change to institutional investors, as well as to general fiscal stability, were
recently highlighted in a proposal by the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”).3 The Governor of the Bank of England also gave a speech to institutional
* Assistant Professor at the University of The Bahamas. She is currently
an Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Fellow for 2018. The author
would like to thank the participants of the 2017 J.B. & Maurice C.
Shapiro Environmental Law Symposium on Private Environmental
Governance at the George Washington University Law School for their
comments.
1.

2.

3.

The Paris Agreement includes ambitious long-term temperature goals of holding any increase in the global average temperature to “well below 2°C” and
the aspirational goal of pursuing efforts to limit that increase to 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels. UNFCCC, Adoption of The Paris Agreement, FCCC/
CP/2015/L.9/Rev. 1, 4(1) (Dec. 12, 2015); see infra Section 3 for a complete
discussion of the Paris Agreement.
Six percent of local government UK pension funds—£1.4 billion of £230 billion—is invested in fossil fuel corporations. Fossil Free et al., Local Government Pensions, Fossil Fuels, & the Transition to the New Economy
3–4 (2015) (discussing the total and average investment by UK local authorities in fossil fuel companies). This has led for a call to divest from fossil fuels.
See id. (claiming divestment is bolstered by a moral and financial argument).
But see Attracta Mooney, Growing Number of Pension Funds Divers from Fossil Fuels, Fin. Times (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/fe88b78829ad-11e7-9ec8-168383da43b7 (discussing the controversial nature of weighing gains and losses on fossil fuel investment). Some pensions have begun to
divest. See id.
Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Fin. Disclosures (2017),
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Report-062817.pdf.
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investors emphasizing “the tragedy of the horizons” between
long-term climate change risks, and short-term business,
political, and investment cycles.4 Significant effort has been
expended over the years by carbon-major companies to produce information-based disclosures on carbon emissions, and
investors and other groups have formed their own private
governance regimes based on disclosure initiatives.
Institutional investors have the potential to incentivize
these companies to provide further and more decision-useful climate-related disclosures, and an enhanced disclosure
movement is already underway due in part to investor action
and shareholder resolutions. Enhanced disclosure, which
highlights systemic risks to these companies, could also
catalyze these companies into making different and more
climate-friendly capital expenditure choices, particularly in
relation to post-2030 resources. While this transition has
yet to occur, this Article will investigate whether a tipping
point in investor action on climate disclosure is occurring,
and whether the Paris Agreement, as well as a risk management approach to climate change, may coalesce to support
more progressive action in carbon-major companies.
The Conference of the Parties’ (“COP”) adoption of
the Paris Agreement (“Paris Agreement” or “Agreement”)
provides several voluntary mechanisms to private actors to
encourage mitigation action, particularly in Part IV. The
section outlining the Non-State Actor Zone provides a registration mechanism for climate change actions undertaken
by stakeholders who were not parties to the COP (“nonParty stakeholders”). This section also anticipates that
regular opportunities will be provided for non-Party stakeholders to participate in the technical examination process
on mitigation, and establishes a high-level event during the
period from 2016 through 2020 which will encourage new
4.

Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, Chairman, Fin. Stability Bd.,
Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon- Climate Change and Financial Stability,
Address at Lloyd’s of London (Sept. 29, 2015) (unpublished transcript) (on file
with the Bank of England).
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or strengthen existing voluntary initiatives arising from the
technical examination process. Post-2020, Part V invites
the private sector to scale up efforts to reduce emissions.
There are few references to the private sector within the Paris
Agreement itself, although the Agreement does establish a
voluntary mechanism designed to contribute to mitigation
efforts under Article 6(4). While this mechanism is reserved
for use by the Parties whom have signed the Agreement, its
intention is to incentivize and facilitate participation in mitigation efforts by private entities that are authorized by States
to participate. Article 6(8) also recognizes the importance of
nonmarket mechanisms which enhance private sector participation in the implementation of nationally determined
contributions.
It appears, therefore, that the Paris Agreement and its
related COP decision anticipate enhanced engagement by
private actors, including institutional investors, although the
mechanisms appear to be largely voluntary. Significant barriers still prevent full integration of climate change risk impacts
into investment strategies for institutional investors. This
Article will analyze: (1) the risks to UK-based institutional
investors in energy companies including stranded assets;
(2) the sustainable investment movement; and (3) whether
the Paris Agreement, combined with a risk management
approach, may provide clearer pathways to fully integrate
climate change risk into mainstream investment strategies.
Section 1 of this Article provides an overview of issues facing
institutional investors in relation to climate change, including systemic barriers such as the obligations of fiduciary
duties and short-termism. Section 2 provides an analysis of
the sustainable investment movement, and its impacts on climate action by institutional investors. Section 3 analyzes
the Paris Agreement and the related COP decision, seeking
areas that may provide assistance to climate-savvy institutional investors. Section 4 concludes that, although the Paris
Agreement is historic in its treatment of nonstate actors, it
is a permissive global regime, and must be combined with
momentum building around risk management and climate
change to truly provide a pathway to fully integrate climate
change risk into mainstream investment strategies.

I.

Institutional Investors in the United
Kingdom and Climate Change: Risks,
Stranded Assets, Fiduciary Duties and
Short-Termism

The types, activities, and behaviors of institutional investors vary across jurisdictions.5 Institutional investors include
banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, as well as
pooled investment vehicles such as hedge funds, mutual
funds, endowments, unit trusts, sovereign wealth funds, and
5.

See, e.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment
and Corporate Governance, in Institutional Investors and Corporate
Governance 10, 10–11 (Theodor Baums et al., eds. 2011); Mark J. Roe,
Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan and America, in
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 23, 28 (Theodor
Baums et al., eds. 2011).
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private equity.6 In the United Kingdom, institutional investors dominate domestic equity markets and include mainly
pension funds and insurance companies.7 While institutional investors can be a force of good and will be a necessary part of the transition to a low-carbon or no-carbon
future, the international character of their activities can also
undermine national action on climate change.8 Benjamin
J. Richardson, a prominent scholar in the area of corporate
social responsibility and environmental law, notes that investors are often “unseen polluters,” because emphasis for the
low-carbon transition is often focused on the energy companies themselves. 9 The diffuse nature of investor holdings, the
ease of exit in securities markets, and the passivity of many
investors can divorce their actions from moral agency and,
therefore, make them immune to the environmental damage
caused by the companies they invest in.10 Virginia Harper
Ho, a professor in the areas of corporate governance, sustainability, and finance, argues, however, that increased concentration of investors in publicly traded companies means that
shareholder passivity is no longer such an extensive problem.11
Institutional investors cover a number of actors, including
the asset owner (the institution having direct rights over the
asset), and the asset managers or investment/fund managers (who are responsible for the day-to-day management of
the schemes the assets are invested in).12 Asset owners typically delegate this day-to-day management authority to their
investment managers, and instructions for management are
often included in the investment mandate—although trustees
of these investment funds remain the ultimate decision makers.13 Although institutional investors may become shareholders if they invest equity in a company possessing assets
that may be suitable for low-carbon transition initiatives,
they may not necessarily inherit fiduciary duties towards that
company’s beneficiaries (unlike that company’s asset owners, whom often remain the sole trustees of the investment
fund).14 The increasing number of financial intermediaries
used in recent years further separates institutional investors
from firms, and therefore reduces the ability of institutional
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

See Petra Nix & Jean Jinghan Chen, The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study 44 (2013). See
also Paul Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A
Review 5 ¶ 8, (2001) (discussing the most common types of institutional
investors in the United Kingdom: occupational investment and life insurance
companies).
See Walter de Gruyter & Paul L. Davies, Institutional Investors in the United
Kingdom, in Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance257,
258 (Theodor Baums et al. eds. 2011).
See Benjamin J. Richardson, Financial Markets and Socially Responsible Investing, in Company Law and Sustainability 227–28, (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2015).
See id. at 228.
See id. at 227–28
Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring
Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. Corp. L. 647, 676 (2016).
See generally Tony Hoskins & Martin Batt, Corporate Responsibility and Environmental Investing, in Environmental Alpha: Institutional Investors
and Climate Change 347 (Angelo A. Calvello ed., 2010); The Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries Law Com. No. 350,
xii (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325509/41342_HC_368_LC350_Print_Ready.pdf; see also,
Myners, supra note 6, at ¶ 2.1.
Law Commission, supra note 12, at xii; see also, Myners, supra note 6, at ¶ 2.2.
Myners, supra note 6 at 45.
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investors to monitor investment decisions.15 Fiduciary duties
can also be applied to asset managers who have an obligation
to invest prudently to facilitate profitability, diversification,
liquidity, and, ultimately, the safety of investments, as well as
the preservation of investment capital.16
While defining fiduciary duties are an “intractable
problem”17 in law, the Law Commission recently characterized the duty as “an undertaking to act to advance the
interests of another.”18 Trustees of pension funds are also
governed by Section 34 of the Pensions Act of 1995, providing them with wide investment powers. Attempts to define
fiduciary duties also appear in case law,19 particularly the
problematic case of Cowan v. Scargill.20 This 1984 English
trusts case attempted to ascertain the duties of trustees over
oversaw assets held by the Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme.21
Arthur Scargill, leader of the National Union of Mineworkers, joined the pension scheme’s Board of Trustees, and advocated against the Board’s decision to move the fund’s assets
out of its overseas investments or any industry which was a
competitor to the UK coal industry.22 The presiding judge,
Sir Robert Edgar Megarry, Vice Chancellor of the Supreme
Court, provided an extensive decision discussing the duties
of trustees, holding that trustees must make decisions not
based on their own personal beliefs, but based on serving
the best interests of present and future beneficiaries.23 Sir
Megarry further noted that, where the purpose of a trust is to
provide financial benefits for its beneficiaries, their best interests are usually their financial best interests.24 Scargill has
largely been interpreted as restricting trustees from making
investment decisions based on perceived nonfinancial benefits such as environmental, social, and governance.
Climate change poses “systemic risk[s]” to the whole economy, and therefore directly effects long-term investors, such
as those investing in pension funds.25 Institutional investors,
in particular, should be concerned about risks to carbonmajor entities, as institutional investors are “universal owners” in that they invest in highly diversified and long-term
portfolios.26 These types of investors have a direct interest in
15. Harper Ho, supra note 10, at 678.
16. Mirjam Staub-Bisang, Sustainable Investing for Institutional Investors Risks, Regulations and Strategies, 82 (2012).
17. Law Commission, supra note 12, at ¶ 3.14.
18. This includes elements of trust, vulnerability and expectation. See id. at ¶ 3.17.
19. See id. at ¶ ¶ 4.3–4.4.
20. Cowan v. Scargill, [1985] IRLR 260; see also The Occupational Pensions
Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/3378, Regulation 4 (2).
21. Cowan v. Scargill, [1985] IRLR 260, 262–66.
22. Id. at 263–63.
23. Id. at 265–67.
24. Id. at 265–66.
25. Dr. Craig Mackenzie & Francisco Ascui, Investor Leadership on Climate
Change: An Analysis of the Investment Country’s Role on Climate Change, and
Snapshot of Recent Investor Activity, United Nations Global Compact: Caring for Climate Series 10 (2009).
26. Principles of Responsible Inv. & UNEP Fin. Initiative, Universal Ownership: Why Environmental Externalities Matter to Institutional Investors 3 (2011),
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/universal_ownership_full.pdf;
see also Mindy S. Lubber, Risks and Their Impacts on Institutional Investors, in
Environmental Alpha: Institutional Investors and Climate Change,
79, 84 (Angelo A. Calvello ed., 2010) (discussing the risks and responses related to investment in a petroleum-based economy predicated on continuous
growth).
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ensuring the long-term overall health of the economy.27 This
is also of concern to UK investors, as 19% of FTSE 10028
companies are involved in natural resource extraction, and a
further 11% are involved in the energy, utilities, chemicals,
and construction industries.29 London is a coal-centered
exchange and acts as the primary market in which extractive
companies raise capital.30 Companies such as Royal Dutch
Shell and AngloAmerican are among leading fossil fuel companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, and UK pension funds are heavily invested in fossil fuel companies.31

A.

Risks

New risks and opportunities are emerging for the investment
community as a result of climate change and the shift to
renewable energy. Investments in cleaner technology provide
opportunities for job creation, economic growth, and greater
returns for investors.32 However, climate change also poses
physical, liability, and transition risks to financial stability.
Physical risks are those that come from climate-related events
that cause damage to property and infrastructure.33 Liability
risks arise when those who have suffered from the negative
impacts of climate change seek compensation from those
who they hold responsible.34 Transition risks are the financial
risks from shifting to a lower-carbon economy.35 These risks
include changes in policy, technology, and reassessing the
value of assets.36 The costs associated with increased regulation and potential noncompliance are known as regulatory
risk.37 Regulatory risk has a short-term impact on multiple
sectors, and thus the outcomes like those in the Paris Agreement should be of interest to many investors.38
Despite the risks involved, until recently investors have
generally been slow to realize the impact of climate change
and have not actively encouraged the mitigation of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. Although Pricewaterhouse
Coopers’ Carbon Disclosure Project (“CDP”) estimated in
2010 that 78% of companies reported at least one significant risk from climate change to their business,39 another
27. Principles of Responsible Inv. & UNEP Fin. Initiative, supra note 26, at
9; Lubber supra note 26, at 87.
28. The Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index.
29. Mark Carney, supra note 4, at 11.
30. Carbon Tracker Initiative & Grantham Research Inst. of Climate
Change and the Env’t, Unburnable Carbon 2013: Wasted Capital and
Stranded Assets, 20–23 (2013), <http://carbontracker.live.kiln.digital/Unburnable-Carbon-2-Web-Version.pdf>.
31. Nick Robins & Cary Krosinsky, After the Credit Crunch: The Future of Sustainable Investing, Oxford: Pub. Policy Research 195 (2009).
32. See Ceres, 2012 Investor Action Plan on Climate Change Risks & Opportunities
1 (2012), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/governance/2012/investor-actionplan.pdf.
33. Fin. Stability Board, Proposal for a Disclosure Task Force on Climate-Related
Risks 1 (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Disclosuretask-force-on-climate-related-risks.pdf; Carney, supra note 4, at 6.
34. Fin. Stability Board, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Carbon Disclosure Project 2010: Global 500 Report 33 (2010), https://www.cdp.net/CDPResults/CDP-2010-G500.pdf.
38. Lubber, supra note 26, at 81. The Bank of England and the TCFD recently
consolidated these risks into Physical and Transition risks, the latter including
regulatory risks.
39. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, supra note 37, at 29.
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analysis noted that the majority of respondents took a very
narrow view of climate risk, and 44% said they did not consider climate change as a material issue to their portfolio
investments.40 According to the latter study, 83% of asset
managers relied on United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) filings for corporate disclosures about
climate risk, and 72% relied on sustainability reports of companies.41 Even the insurance industry has been slow to realize the damages caused by climate change. Sharlene Leurig
from Ceres notes that the insurance industry focuses mainly
on coastal threats and does not pay sufficient attention to
other threats that may be caused by climate change such
as floods, droughts, snowstorms, or climate change litigation.42 However, a recent report by the World Wildlife Fund
(“WWF”), Ceres, CDP, and Calvert notes that a significant
portion of Fortune 500 U.S. firms are deriving significant
benefit in the form of cost savings as a result of their energy
efficiency efforts.43 Still, companies in the financial sector
recently ranked just ahead of the worst performers—energy
companies—on the list of Fortune 500 companies with climate targets.44
In the late 1980s to mid-1990s, institutional investors were
not very interested in climate change in the United Kingdom.45
However, amendments to the Pensions Act,46 the Myners
and Kay Reviews, and the socially responsible investment
movement began to increase interest.47 The 2001 Myners
Review highlighted the problem of short-termism48 caused
by asset managers’ review of quarterly reports and encouraged institutional investors to be more active and mindful of
environmental social governance (“ESG”) issues.49 The 2012
Kay Review concluded that short-termism was a problem
in UK equity markets stemming from a decline of trust as
well as a misalignment of investment horizons and incentives
40. Kirsten Snow Spalding, Investors Analyze Climate Risks and Opportunities: A Survey of Asset Managers’ Practices, CERES Inv’r Network
on Climate Risk 2 (2010), https://www.scribd.com/document/24868483/
Investors-Analyze-Climate-Risks-and-Opportunities-A.
41. Id. at 16.
42. Sharlene Leurig, Climate Risk Disclosure By Insurers: Evaluating
Insurer Response to the NAIC Climate Disclosure Survey, CERES 5
(2011),
https://www.insurance.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2011climate-disclosure-survey-results.pdf.
43. World Wildlife Fund et al., Power Forward 3.0: How the largest U.S.
Companies are Capturing Business Value While Addressing Climate
Change 2 (2017), https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/1049/
files/original/Power_Forward_3.0_-_April_2017_-_Digital_Second_Final.
pdf?1493325339.
44. Id. at 17. A recent report by ClientEarth also notes that misconceptions about
the financial impacts of climate risk are still pervasive within corporate boards.
ClientEarth, Risky Business: Climate Change and Professional Liability Risks for Auditors, 3 (2017), https://www.documents.clientearth.org/
wp-content/uploads/library/2017-12-13-risky-business-climate-change-andprofessional-liability-risks-for-auditors-ce-en.pdf.
45. Stephanie Pfeifer & Rory Sullivan, Public Policy, Institutional Investors and Climate Change: A UK Case-Study, 89 Climactic Change 245, 252 (2008).
46. See id. at 254 (noting amendments made in 2000 to the 1995 Pensions Act
required trustees to disclose the extent to which they had taken into account
social, environmental or ethical considerations in their investment process).
47. Id. at 255; U.K. Dep’t for Bus. Innovation & Skills, Implementation of
the Kay Review: Progress Report, 14–15 (2014).
48. Myners, supra note 6, at 10. Short-termism refers to the prioritization of
short-term, often quarterly, profit making over longer-term investments in
companies.
49. Pfeifer & Sullivan, supra note 45, at 255.
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throughout the investment chain.50 The Kay Review also
found that hyperactivity in equity trading was also contributing to short-termism.51 This hyperactivity (churning) of
stocks was partly due to divergences in investment time horizons, an issue raised by Mark Carney, the Governor of the
Bank of England.52 The Kay Review found that performance
horizons, by which asset managers are judged, were much
shorter than value discovery horizons where the fundamental
value of an asset is revealed.53 Shortening of the performance
horizon led to an emphasis on short-term profits, and away
from longer-term values of underlying assets.54
Stephanie Pfeifer and Rory Sullivan, who write extensively on climate change and investor risks, note that the
publication of a report on climate change by the Universities
Superannuation Scheme (“USS”) pension fund in 2001 was
the real catalyst for motivating institutional investors in the
United Kingdom to pay more attention to the issue.55 In
addition, the launch of the European Union Emissions Trading System (“EU-ETS”) in the mid-2000s further captured
the attention of investors.56 Nonfinancial issues, including
ESG issues, are now a common concern among institutional
investors globally.57 The Paris Agreement may provide a
further boon to investor initiatives on climate change as its
lower temperature goals may spur on regulatory efforts and
motivate further emission cuts.
Investors in utilities are particularly at risk to climate
change impacts due to sunk costs in infrastructure in constructing and maintaining these entities, as well as water
scarcity, which effects the utility’s ability to generate electricity.58 Carbon-major companies—and utility companies in
particular—are exposed, due not only to changes in weather
patterns and finite fossil fuel resources, but also to carbon
regulation and the EU-ETS.59 Since 2011, the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report has consistently ranked
climate change as one of its top five global risks in terms of
its potential impacts on economies as well as the likelihood
that an impactful event may occur.60 In 2016, the Generation Foundation ranked private entities’ failure to mitigate
against and adapt to climate change as the top global risk in
terms of potential economic impact, and in 2017 a changing
climate was ranked as the second risk that may determine
50. John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, 9 (July 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-finalreport.pdf.
51. Id. at 14.
52. See Carney, supra note 4, at 4.
53. See Kay, supra note 50, at 39.
54. Id. at 40; see also, Law Commission, supra note 12, at 24.
55. Pfeifer & Sullivan, supra note 45, 255.
56. Rory Sullivan & Andy Gouldson, Does Voluntary Carbon Reporting Meet Investors’ Needs?, 36 J. Cleaner Prod. 60, 65 (Nov. 2012).
57. Harper Ho, supra note 11, at 650–51.
58. Mark Fulton & Bruce M. Kahn, Investing in Climate Change, in Environmental Alpha: Institutional Investors and Climate Change 185 (Angelo A.
Calvello ed., 2010).
59. Baran Doda, How to Price Carbon in Good Times . . . and Bad 13 (2014),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Howto-price-carbon_Dec_2014.pdf.
60. World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2017, 4 (2017),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf.
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global development.61 Investors in extractive energy companies face additional risks, as the assets of these companies
may become stranded due to increased regulation of emissions and the transition to a low-carbon economy.

B.

Stranded Assets

Energy companies are particularly vulnerable to transition risks, which can include the risk of stranded assets.62
“Stranded assets” can be defined as assets that “lose[] significant economic value well ahead of its anticipated useful
life.”63 Fossil fuel assets can become stranded due to changes
in regulation, carbon pricing, energy innovation leading to
reduced costs of renewable energy,64 social and economic
pressures, increasing litigation risk for fossil fuel companies,
and physical environmental challenges.65 Prior to the Paris
Agreement, Mark Carney estimated that if the world were to
meet the Agreement’s 2°C global temperature goal, it would
render the vast majority of fossil fuel reserves stranded assets,
because they would become “literally unburnable without
expensive carbon capture technology.”66 He also emphasized that the exposure of UK investors to such shifts was
“potentially huge.”67 Before the Paris Agreement, the Carbon Tracker Initiative and Grantham Research Institute
on Climate Change and the Environment estimated that
60–80% of coal, oil, and gas reserves of its listed firms were
unburnable in 2012.68 The new lower global temperature
goals in the Paris Agreement increase the likelihood that fossil fuel reserves worldwide may become stranded assets if parties decide to limit domestic emissions to reach these global
temperature goals. The Leave It in the Ground Initiative
(“LINGO”) estimates that decreasing temperatures by 33%
of the 1.5°C global temperature goals would mean that only
16% of global fossil fuel reserves could be used, and 84%
(2,427 gigatons) of reserves must be kept in the ground.69
Scientists have estimated that only 275 gigatons of the
world’s remaining 746 gigatons of fossil fuel reserves can
be burned to avoid a global temperature increase of 2°C or
more.70 Of the seventy incorporated entities that hold fossil fuel reserves, the twenty-eight State-owned entities hold
61. Id.
62. Generation Foundation, Stranded Carbon Assets Why and How Carbon Risks Should be Incorporated into Investment Analysis 1 (2013),
https://www.genfound.org/media/1374/pdf-generation-foundation-strandedcarbon-assets-v1.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Ashim Paun, HSBC, Stranded Assets: What Next? 1 (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.businessgreen.com/digital_assets/8779/hsbc_Stranded_assets_
what_next.pdf.
65. Nancy Schneider, Revisiting Divestment, 66 Hastings L.J. 589, 608 (2015).
66. Pilita Clark, Mark Carney Warns Investors Face ‘Huge’ Climate
Change Losses, Fin. Times (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.ft.com/
content/622de3da-66e6-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.
67. Id.
68. Carbon Tracker Initiative, supra note 30, at 4.
69. Kjell Kühne, The Global Carbon Budget After the Paris Agreement, Leave it in
the Ground Initiative (Feb. 18, 2016), http://leave-it-in-the-ground.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Post-Paris-Carbon-Budget-LINGO.pdf.
70. Richard Heede & Naomi Oreske, Potential Emissions of CO2 and Methane
from Proved Reserves of Fossil Fuel: an Alternative Analysis, 36 Global Envtl.
Change 12, 12 (2016).

9

approximately 90% of all reserves of oil.71 The remaining forty-two investor-owned entities hold the minority of
reserves.72 Heed and Orekes estimate that exploitation of
these existing reserves would not put the earth’s climate over
the 2°C global threshold.73 However, they also note that continued exploration and development of new reserves (beyond
proved reserves), by investor-owned companies would push
the earth’s climate “well past” the 2°C global goal.74 As a
result, they note that risks to investors in these private entities lie primarily in capital expenditure in ongoing expansion and development of fossil fuel resources, and investor
action should be focused on dissuading these companies
from investing further in fossil fuel exploration and development.75 Because existing proven reserves are expected to
be exhausted by 2030 or earlier,76 capital expenditure for the
exploration and development of reserves post-2030 should be
of most concern to investors.
On its current trajectory, the capital investments in exploration and development of reserves could amount to over $6
trillion over the next ten years, and may in fact be “wasted
capital” if these assets become stranded.77 The markets are
not systematically pricing the emerging risk of stranded
assets in these types of companies. Carbon Tracker and the
Grantham Institute note: “[a]n implicit assumption is that
the fossil fuel owned by listed companies will go on to be
developed and sold and the capital released used to replace
reserves with new discoveries.”78 They note that 100%
reserve replacement ratios are performance metrics that are
currently rewarded by the markets,79 thus encouraging investors to view current and future reserves as valuable assets. In
their view, valuation tools need to be recalibrated, as the markets should no longer reward the replacement of reserves, and
should take into account increasing global temperatures, and
therefore re-price assets.80 However, the risks of transitioning to a low-carbon economy are so great that the Financial
Stability Board (“FSB”) determined that abrupt re-pricing
could negatively impact financial stability.81 Mark Carney
highlighted the “success is failure” climate paradox: namely,
that too rapid a transition to alternative energy systems could
“destabilise markets, spark a procyclical crystallisation of
losses and lead to a persistent tightening of financial conditions: a climate Minsky moment.”82 The risk paradigm
therefore is two-fold: the risks of not transitioning away from
fossil fuels are greater in the longer term, but the risks of too
abrupt a transition can increase systemic financial risks in the
shorter-term. Aligning these two risk horizons is a pressing
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 15.
Id.
See id. at 18–19.
Id. at 18.
Heede & Oreske, supra note 70, at 19.
Id. at 19.
See, e.g., Carbon Tracker Initiative, supra note 30, at 16.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 36.
Fin. Stability Board, supra note 33, at 1–2.
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, Chairman, Fin. Stability Bd,
Address Arthur Burns Memorial Lecture, Berlin (Sept. 22, 2016) http://www.
fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Resolving-the-climate-paradox.pdf.
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issue and should be of primary concern to investors in these
types of companies. Indeed, one of the reasons why largescale revaluation of fossil fuel assets has not yet happened is
partly because markets do not believe governments are serious about reducing corporate emissions.83 Other reasons are
that fiduciary duties and short-termism still fuel investment
decisions.84

C.

Fiduciary Duties and Short-Termism

The effort to maximize profits in the short-term and misunderstanding of fiduciary duties may be undermining action
by institutional investors on climate change. A report by
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer prepared for the United
Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) indicated that
fiduciary duties are a key limitation on the exercise of discretion by investment decision-makers.85 However, they note
that the profit maximization incentive exercised by institutional investors stems from a misunderstanding of Cowan v.
Scargill86 and that a perceived requirement of profit maximization has become a barrier to the more comprehensive
integration of ESG issues into institutional investment activities.87 Pfeifer and Sullivan note that the fiduciary duties of
trustees to act in the best interests of their beneficiaries has
been interpreted in the context of pension funds as “exclusively in financial terms as the [optimization] of investment
returns.”88 This interpretation, combined with a focus on
short-term profits, has led institutional investors to ignore
environmental issues such as climate change.89 The Freshfields report was groundbreaking in that it determined that
asset managers and institutional investment consultants
have a proactive duty to raise ESG considerations with their
clients.90 This finding has been commented on by a recent
report by the Law Commission, which states that trustees
are not required to maximize returns but instead must strive
to secure realistic returns over the long-term.91 The report
notes that while trustees do not have a duty to consider ESG
factors, they should take into account risks to the long-term
sustainability of a company’s performance.92
Harper Ho notes that risk-related activism can serve a useful function in realigning investors and firm management
83. Carbon Tracker Initiative, supra note 30, at 36.
84. Id. at 25.
85. Asset Mgmt. Working Grp., United Nations Env’t Programme Fin. Initiative, A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental,
Social and Governance Issues Into Institutional Investment, 8 (Oct.
2005), available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields_
legal_resp_20051123.pdf.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 9, 82.
88. Pfeifer & Sullivan, supra note 45, at 248. Milton Friedman articulated the
orthodox view that the duty of businessmen is to ignore socially responsible
investments or an investment on the basis of anything other than short-term,
purely financial monetary considerations. See also Paul Q. Watchman, The
Case for Climate Change as the Paramount Fiduciary Issue Facing Institutional
Investors, in Environmental Alpha: Institutional Investors and Climate
Change 101, 101–02 (Angelo A. Calvello ed., 2010) (“business is business”).
89. Pfeifer & Sullivan, supra note 45, at 248.
90. See Staub-Bisang, supra note 16, at 79–80.
91. Law Commission, supra note 12, ¶ 5.52.
92. Id. at ¶ 5.76.
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to focus on long-term value.93 She highlights that shared
economic goals of long-term value among investors and firm
management can coalesce both risk-related activism and
responsible investing mandates.94 Laura Deeks, one of the
initial authors in the area of fiduciary duties and sustainable
investment, notes that fiduciary duties can in fact be a boon
to the sustainable investment movement because of the flexible nature of the duties.95 In her view, institutional investors’ increasing concern for ESG issues can prompt fiduciary
duties to evolve and adapt in order to cater to these concerns.96
Dhar and Barker assert that concerns over climate change
have become so great that fiduciary duties may now require a
trustee’s “diligent consideration” of climate change’s impacts
on investment portfolios and treatment.”97 Deeks notes that
the emerging prominence of ESG factors may now expose
fiduciaries to liability for violating their fiduciary duties if
they fail to take them into account.98
Fiduciary duties, however, are often cited by asset owners
and advisors as one of the barriers to responsible investing.99
In addition, traditional valuation tools employed by institutional investors emphasize short-termism and can directly
contravene the longer time frames needed to account for
many ESG impacts.100 Spalding notes that three-quarters of
the asset managers interviewed for her study did not consider
climate change risks as part of their traditional due diligence
process.101 Concerns about climate change are often too distant to be accounted for in the short-term performance metrics employed by many investment managers.102 Emphasis
by institutional investors on short-term profits—particularly
in carbon intensive industries—will create a barrier to transitioning to low-carbon economies.103
Sani Zou, a scholar in the area of climate change and
investment, notes that there are two common misconceptions about climate change among the investment community.104 The first is that climate change does not directly affect
93. Harper Ho, supra note 11, at 696.
94. Id.
95. Laura E. Deeks, Discourse and Duty: University Endowments, Fiduciary Law
and the Cultural Politics of Fossil Fuel Divestment, 47 Envtl. L. Rev. 335, 418
(2017).
96. Id.
97. Tony Dhar & Sarah Barker, MinterEllison, From “Ethical Crusade”
to Financial Mainstream—Institutional Investors Raise the Accountability Bar on ESG Risk Management (June 22, 2015), http://
forms.minterellison.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/campaigns/
Campaign-ClimateChange-2.pdf.
98. Deeks, supra note 95, at 343–44.
99. United Nations Env’t Programme Fin. Initiative, Fiduciary Duty in
the 21st Century 16, 16 (2015) [hereinafter UNEP Fin. Initiative], http://
www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciary_duty_21st_century.pdf.
100. Principles for Responsible Inv., Integrated Analysis How Investors
are Addressing Environmental Social and Governance Factors in
Fundamental Equity Valuation, 6 (Feb. 2013); see Rob Lake, Financial
Reform, Institutional Investors and Sustainable Development: A review of current policy initiatives and proposals for further progress
at 19, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. (Sept. 2015), http://apps.unep.org/publications/pmtdocuments/-Financial_Reform,_Institutional_Investors_and_Sustainable_Development___A_Review_of_Current_Policy_Initiatives_and_
Proposals_for_Further_Progress-201.pdf.
101. See Spalding, supra note 40, at 18.
102. See Pfiefer & Sullivan, supra note 45, at 259.
103. See MacKenzie & Ascui, supra note 25, at 36.
104. Sani Zou et al., Mainstreaming Climate Change into Financial Governance Rationale and Entry Points, at 2, No. 5 Center for International
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the financial sector. The second is that climate change does
not fall within the mandate of financial sector governance.105
They note that there is a problem in matching the supply
and demand of low-carbon capital, as investors need a certain level of market and policy expertise to engage in lowcarbon investing that is currently missing, and acquiring this
expertise involves high transaction costs that are unattractive
to many investors.106 A recent Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) paper confirms
that the financial sector faces information and knowledge
barriers, but attributes this to a lack of standardized corporate information on GHG emissions and climate risks.107
The Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures
has confirmed that the lack of “consistent, comparable, reliable and clear” information on climate risks hamper proper
investment decisions.108 In addition, the lack of information
regarding the financial implications of climate impacts constitutes a key gap, thereby barring effective investor action.109
In a letter to the Chairperson of the SEC in 2015, institutional investors representing over $1.9 trillion in assets stated
that they were concerned that oil and gas companies were not
disclosing sufficient information about their capital expenditures and exploration plans, therefore omitting material risks
for investors to consider.110 In response to these barriers, the
concept of “sustainable investing” has emerged, and new initiatives are developing to provide enhanced risk-related disclosure on climate change.

II.

The Sustainable Investment Movement

A number of definitions of “sustainable investing” have
emerged, and currently there is no one stable definition.111
The European Sustainable Investment Forum (“EUROSIF”)
defines it as “any type of investment process that combines
investors’ financial objectives with their concerns about [ESG]
Governance Innovation, June 2015, http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Mainstreaming-Climate-Change-into-Financial-Governance-Rationale-and-EntryPoints.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4.
107. Yoko Nobouka, et al., OECD/IEA, Encouraging Increased Climate Action by
Non-Party Stakeholders 12 (Oct. 2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5jm56w74s5wg-en.pdf?expires=1504637892&id=id&accnam
e=guest&checksum=3A30F02B6317029B89B2541D47FF7F1C. Note that
more efforts are being invested in creating investor-useful metrics, for example the Church of England Pensions Board together with the Environmental
Agency Pensions Fund have created a free online toolkit called The Transition
Pathway Initiative which analyses plans by fossil fuel and energy intensive companies to transition to sustainable business models.
108. See Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, Recommendations
of the Rask Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (Dec. 14,
2016),
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/16_1221_
TCFD_Report_Letter.pdf.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Letter from Ceres to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chair, Securities & Exchange
Comm’n 1 (Apr. 17, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/disclosure-effectiveness/disclosureeffectiveness-38.pdf.
111. See, e.g., Meg Voorhes & Joshua Humphries, Recent Trends in Sustainable and
Responsible Investing in the United States, J. Investing 90, 91 (2011). Kierman notes that sustainable investing differs from socially responsible investing that is only values-based—sustainable investing focuses on investment risk
and return. See Matthew J. Kierman, SRI or Not SRI?, in Environmental
Alpha: Institutional Investors and Climate Change 131–32 (Angelo A.
Calvello, ed., 2010).
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issues.”112 Richardson refers to the “responsible investing”
movement as one that is “attentive to long-term environmental issues that underpin a sustainable investing portfolio.”113
Institutional investors can adopt a variety of sustainable
investment strategies that include active approaches, such as
including ESG factors in the investment process, shareholder
activism through the use of shareholder resolutions, and
engagement with management.114 The three broad strategies
investors are taking on ESG issues include: (1) shareholder
resolutions; (2) mandated disclosures through public listing
agencies; (3) and voluntary disclosure initiatives.115 A number of investors have taken more dramatic action through
the divestment movement, such as the Church of England’s
divestments from thermal coal and tar in 2015.

A.

Divestment

The divestment movement began in United States colleges in
2011116 when students asked their institutions to freeze new
investments in the fossil fuel industry and to divest existing
stocks.117 Since 2011, the divestment movement has grown,
with the Rockefeller Brothers Fund announcing in September 2014 its plan to decrease its investments in fossil fuel; as
well as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s divesting
its entire holdings in BP in 2016.118 The movement has also
reached the United Kingdom, with the Church of England
announcing its divestments from thermal coal and tar sands
in May 2015,119 and a long-standing campaign by The Guardian newspaper called “Keep it in the Ground,” advocating
for divestment in fossil fuel industries.120 In January 2017,
the Irish Parliament voted to divest the holdings of its Strategic Investment Fund entirely from fossil fuels.121 Nancy
112. EUROSIF, European SRI Study 8 (2014), http://www.eurosif.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Eurosif-SRI-Study-20142.pdf.
113. Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Law and Responsible Investing in
Nature’s Trust 2 (2013).
114. Staub-Bisang, supra note 16, at 80; Sullivan & Gouldson, supra note 56, at
61.
115. Lubber, supra note 26, at 88.
116. The movement began at Swarthmore College in 2011 and quickly spread to
other academic institutions such as the University of North Carolina and the
University of Illinois. Martina K. Linnenluecke et al., Divestment from Fossil
Fuel Companies: Confluence Between Policy and Strategic Viewpoints, 40 Austl.
J. of Mgmt. 478, 479 (2015); see also UNC-Chapel Hill Students Make Strides
for Clean Energy Investment, Sierra Club, http://www.sierraclub.org/Youth/
unc-chapel-hill-students-make-strides-clean-energy-investment (last visited
Jan. 4, 2017 12:36 PM); University of Illinois Votes for Coal Divestment, Prairie
Rivers Network (Apr. 8, 2016), https://prairierivers.org/articles/2016/04/university-of-illinois-votes-for-coal-divestment/ [https://perma.cc/YNY5-BLL5].
117. See Linnenluecke, supra note 116, at 479.
118. See Divestment Statement, Rockefeller Bros. Fund, https://www.rbf.org/
about/divestment [https://perma.cc/8PG4-KS3J]; see also Damian Carrington, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Divests Entire Holding in BP, The
Guardian (May 12, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/
may/12/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation-divests-entire-holding-in-bp.
119. Leon Kaye, Church of England Announces Divestment from Coal and Tar Sands,
Triple Pundit (May 4, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/05/
church-of-england-announces-divestment-from-coal-and-tar-sands/.
120. See James Randerson, A Story of Hope: The Guardian Launches Phase II of
its Climate Change Campaign, The Guardian (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/05/a-story-of-hope-the-guardianlaunches-phase-two-of-its-climate-change-campaign.
121. Samuel Osborne, Ireland Votes in Favour of Law to Become World’s First Country
to Fully Divest from Fossil Fuels, The Independent (Jan. 27, 2017), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ireland-votes-divest-fossil-fuels-
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Schneider has written extensively on the divestment movement, and noted that there are three phases of divestment: (1)
industry-related public organizations take action; (2) actions
of investors, cities, and public institutions; and (3) the market’s broad recognition of risks in continued investment.122
She notes that, in 2015, the divestment movement was in its
second phase123 —meaning market investors have not systematically started to divest from the fossil fuel industry. Critics
note that the divestment movement may potentially replace
environmentally sensitive investors with neutral investors,
thereby removing one mechanism to pressure companies to
make changes.124 Deeks also notes that divestment can lead
to longer transition time horizons due to the “temporal cost”
incurred as environmentally neutral investors lose opportunities to work with more environmentally sensitive, recalcitrant companies.125

B.

Voluntary Initiatives

Several groups of institutional investors are taking the lead
in mainstreaming a variety of voluntary initiatives, such as
the CDP, Ceres, the Investor Network on Climate Risk, and
Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change.126 These
groups issued a joint statement before the Paris COP citing
their concern that gaps and weaknesses in global policies on
climate change would increase the risks to investments and
the likelihood of more physical damage, as well as increase
the likelihood of more radical policy measures.127 They also
noted that
Ultimately, in order to deliver real changes in investment
flows, international policy commitments need to be implemented into national laws and regulations. These policies
must provide appropriate incentives to invest, be of adequate
duration to improve certainty to investors in long-term
infrastructure investments and avoid retroactive impacts on
existing investments.128

The UNEP formulated the Principles for Responsible Investment (“PRI”) which have, as a central premise, the idea that
responsible investing must acknowledge and consider the
relevance to investors of ESG factors, as well as the longterm health and stability of the entire economy.129 The PRI
defines responsible investing as recognizing “the generation
climate-change-world-first-country-parliament-renewable-energy-a7549121.
html.
122. See Schneider, supra note 65, at 592.
123. Id.
124. Linnenluecke, supra note 116, at 480 (citing Ansar, Caldecott & Tilbury,
Stranded Assets and the Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign: What Does
Divestment Mean for the Valuation of Fossil Fuel Assets 1–81(2013)).
125. Deeks, supra note 95, at 409.
126. The scope of this Article does not allow a comprehensive analysis of all private
environmental governance regimes of investors, but only mentions a few of
these groups. See generally Inst. Inv’rs Grp. on Climate Change, Global
Investors Statement on Climate Change, http://www.iigcc.org/files/publication-files/11DecemberGISCC.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Principles for Responsible Inv., Integrated analysis: How Investors
Are Addressing Environmental Social and Governance Factors in
Fundamental Equity Valuation 7 (Katie Beith et al. eds., 2013), https://
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of long-term sustainable returns is dependent on stable, wellfunctioning and well-governed social, environmental and
economic systems.”130 Investors can use their influence as
shareholders to incentivize companies to be more proactive on climate change, and also to explicitly factor climate
change into core business plans and processes.131
Responses to climate risks such as these by institutional
investors can be tailored to their investment approach and
asset class mix. The Asset Owners Disclosure Project is an
independent nonprofit organization that aims to highlight
the specific financial risks attributable to climate change
and to support investors becoming climate risk mitigation
leaders.132 The project also aims to change short-term investment behavior and drive the largest asset owners to manage
long-term risks of climate change through active management of fossil fuel intensive and high-carbon companies.133
Corporate Knights and As You Sow have recently developed
the “Clean 200” list, ranking the 200 largest companies by
their total clean energy reserves, creating the inverse of their
Carbon Underground 200 list.134
Measuring a portfolio’s carbon footprint and engagement with companies and policymakers by investors is an
important part of transitioning to a low-carbon economy.135
Institutional investors must participate in the $45 trillion
investment needed through 2050 to meet increased energy
needs through clean technology.136 Pension funds are one
of the most important drivers of the sustainable investment
movement, which is being led by European countries such
as Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom.137
Westphal and Bednar note that large institutional investors
can exert ownership power over managers to make changes
in corporate behavior through proxy contests and filing
shareholder proposals demanding certain changes.138 However, they note that prior to the Paris Agreement, institutional investors had largely failed to bring about widespread
changes in corporate governance.139
Ceres has been particularly active in providing support
to institutional investors submitting shareholder resolutions
to fossil fuel-centered energy companies. In 2010, the SEC
issued guidance on existing disclosure regulations regarding
climate change.140 In 2014, a shareholder resolution initiated
www.unglobalcompact.org/library/209; UNEP Fin. Initiative, supra note 99,
at 3.
130. Principles for Responsible Inv., supra note 100, at 7.
131. Pfieifer & Sullivan, supra note 45, at 246.
132. Asset Owners Disclosure Project et al., Digging Deeper: An in Depth
Examination of the Global Climate 500 Index 2 (2015), http://aodproject.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AODP_GLOBAL_INDEX_REPORT_DIGGING_DEEPER_VIEW.pdf.
133. Id.
134. Toby Heaps Et. Al. Carbon Clean 200: Investing in a Clean Energy
Future, Corporate Knights 2 (2016).
135. Principles for Responsible Investment, Discussion Paper: Reducing
Emissions Across the Portfolio 4 (2015).
136. Fulton & Kahn, supra note 58, at 190.
137. See Staub-Bisang, supra note 16, at 43–47.
138. See James D. Westphal & Michael K. Bednar, The Pacification of Institutional
Investors, Admin. Sci. Q., 29, 29 (2008).
139. See id. at 30.
140. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure
Related to Climate Change 1 (2010).
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by Arjuna Capital and the nongovernmental organization
(“NGO”) As You Sow was successful in pressuring ExxonMobil to agree to provide information to shareholders on the
risks of stranded assets.141 Arjuna Capital was particularly
concerned with unconventional assets such as deep-water
and tar sands oil reserves being listed on the company’s
balance sheet.142 More recently, an appeal by ExxonMobil
to the SEC to block a shareholder resolution from being
included in its shareholder proxy statement in 2016 was
denied on the basis that ExxonMobil’s existing reporting on
climate change was insufficient.143 Although the resolution
did not pass, it demonstrates significant activity amongst
shareholders at these companies. Shareholder resolutions in
2015 at Shell and BP were, however, successfully passed by
an overwhelming majority of shareholders and management,
and required the firms to stress test their climate strategies
against future International Energy Agency (“IEA”) energy
scenarios.144 The Aiming for “A” coalition, which submitted the resolution to BP, stated that it was designed to garner more information on the preparation for transitioning
to a low-carbon economy, including identifying techniques
for managing systemic risk, enhancing collective fiduciary
duties, and amplifying the voice of longer-term investors.145
In March 2017, Royal Dutch Shell decided to withdraw from
the carbon-intensive Canadian oil sands, and tie 10% of
directors’ bonuses to how well the group manages emissions
in refining, chemical, and upstream operations.146 These voluntary transnational networks are forming a type of private
environmental governance that aim to reorient the behavior
of investors regarding climate change.147 Although the systemic impact of these initiatives on firm activity is unclear,
it is clear that investor concern and activity about climaterelated risk is increasing at “unprecedented rates,”148 including within carbon-major firms.

C.

The Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures

The FSB recommended to the G20 that an industry-led disclosure task force on climate change be established to help
investors assess transition plans and changes in the value
141. See Keith Goldberg, Exxon Agrees to Disclose Climate Risks to Investors,
Law360 (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www-law360-com.gwlaw.idm.oclc.org/
articles/520409/exxon-agrees-to-disclose-climate-risks-to-investors.
142. Id.
143. Ernest Scheyder, ExxonMobil Must Allow Climate Change Vote,
Reuters
(Mar.
24,
2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-exxon-mobil-shareholders-exclusive-idUSKCN0WP2TG.
144. See Simon Bowers, BP’s ‘Activist Resolution’ was a Triumph for Environmentalists
– or was it?, The Guardian (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/apr/28/bps-activist-resolution-triumph-for-environmentalists-or-was-it; Gail Moss, Shell, Statoil Investors Vote for Climate Change Disclosure (May 20, 2015), https://www.ipe.com/news/esg/shell-statoil-investorsvote-for-climate-change-disclosure/10008085.fullarticle.
145. BP AGM, Special Resolution – Strategic Resilience for 2035 and Beyond, Apr. 2015 AGM, 1–3.
146. Karolin Schaps, Shell Sells Canadian Oil Sands, Ties Bonuses to Emissions Cuts, Reuters (Mar. 9, 2017), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
us-shell-divestiture-cdn-natural-rsc-idUKKBN16G0PH.
147. Michael MacLeod & Jacob Park, Financial Activism and Global Climate
Change: The Rise of Investor-Driven Governance Networks, 11 Global Envtl.
Pol. 54, 55 (2011).
148. Dhar & Barker, supra note 97, at 2.
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of assets.149 The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosure’s first report identified some of the barriers facing
investors on climate change, which include fragmented and
incomplete reporting by companies, as well as weak corporate
governance mechanisms.150 They conclude that inadequate
disclosures can lead to mispricing of assets, misallocation of
investments could lead to risks to general fiscal stability if repricing of assets is abrupt and widespread.151
The Task Force initiative identified seven broad principles
for effective reporting of climate-related financial disclosures.152 They recommend that climate-related disclosures be
more effective by being (1) relevant, (2) specific and complete,
(3) clear, balanced and understandable, (4) consistent over
time, (5) comparable, (6) reliable and verifiable and objective, and finally (7) timely.153 Adherence to the principles
would be voluntary, but would help to develop common disclosure principles.154 The report recommends that companies
stress-test their emissions against specific emissions scenarios
to provide a wider context of profitability and viability to
investors. While this is a welcome and timely initiative, further voluntary disclosure initiatives are unlikely to overcome
the short-term performance incentive that is creating a barrier to systemic mainstreaming of climate change risk, but
does demonstrate an industry focus on the issue.

D.

The Oxford-Martin Principles and the Enterprise
Principles

Recent initiatives such as the 2018 Oxford-Martin Principles
for Climate-Conscious Investment (“Oxford-Martin Principles”) and the Principles on Climate Obligations of Enterprises (“Enterprise Principles”), may mark a new turning
point for the sustainable investment movement. The OxfordMartin Principles were published by four academics at the
Oxford-Martin School at the University of Oxford. They
are designed to overcome the information asymmetries that
investors face when comparing a variety of company business
plans against specific emissions scenarios. The Oxford-Martin Principles propose three fact-based, climate-specific principles to guide investor decisions.155 These principles ensure
that companies: (1) commit to net-zero emissions; (2) have a
profitable business plan based on net-zero emissions; and (3)
have a quantitative midterm target to properly assess compatibility with the Paris Agreement.156
The Enterprise Principles, published in January 2018, provide an extensive set of thirty principles designed to put for149. Fin. Stability Board, supra note 33, at 1.
150. Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, Phase I Report of
the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, 7–12 (Mar.
31, 2016), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Phase_I_
Report_v15.pdf.
151. Id. at 21.
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id. at 18.
154. Fin. Stability Board, supra note 33, at 4.
155. Richard J. Miller, Cameron Hepburn, John Beddington & Myles R. Allen, Oxford-Martin Principles to Guide Investment Towards a Stable
Climate, 8 Nature Climate Change 2 (2018).
156. Id.
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ward the current state of the law regarding obligations of both
companies (enterprises) and investors.157 The principles act
as a partial successor to the Oslo Global Principles of 2015,
which articulated legal obligations of parties and espoused
more limited obligations of enterprises. The Enterprise Principles provide a more extensive set of legal guidelines for both
enterprises and investors. Drafted by eminent legal scholars
in the field, the Enterprise Principles are explicitly designed
to contribute to opinio juris. Investors themselves (as private
enterprises), have obligations under Principle 2.1 to reduce
their GHG emissions—although pension funds are specifically excluded from the definition of “private enterprise,”
based on considerations such as profitability.158 The Enterprise Principles are tied to the Oslo Principles and the country-based, per capita emissions carbon budgets established
therein. Both sets of principles seek steady global emissions reductions to ensure that global average temperature
increases never exceed pre-industrial averages by more than
2°C. The Enterprise Principles also provide specific obligations to investors to both ascertain and take into account
the GHG emissions of any potential investment project,
including in both construction and operation, and the likelihood of the borrower’s ability to repay in light of those
emissions (Principle 25).159 Investments in coal-fired power
plants or enterprises engaged in fossil fuel-intensive activities require “a compelling justification” (Principle 28),160
and investors are compelled to use their power as investors
to promote compliance with the Principles for any current
or future investments (Principle 29).161 The commentary to
the Enterprise Principles acknowledges the challenges facing
investors regarding GHG emitting businesses. Specifically,
the commentary acknowledges that investors require both
revenues and a return on investment to meet their long-term
commitments, and investing in companies which comply
with the reduction obligations in the Enterprise Principles
may not generate these returns in the near term.162 In those
instances, the Enterprise Principles recommend investing in
the best performing noncompliant companies.163 As to legal
obligations and fiduciary duties, the commentary states that
investors are not only allowed to—but may be legally obliged
to—invest in funds that generate less profits in the near term
if, and to the extent that, such investment may be the only
way to avoid an increase above the 2°C threshold.164 Principle 23 specifically addresses fossil fuel producing companies
and requires them to assess the impacts of any limitations
on future extractions—particularly requiring disclosure of
the risk of stranded assets.165 This principle intends to cover
not only oil extraction and refining, but also the liquefaction
157. Expert Group on Climate Obligations of Enterprises, Principles on
Climate Obligations of Enterprises (2018) 1, 39.
158. Id. at 110–21.
159. Id. at 205–08.
160. Id. at 235–37.
161. Id. at 237–39.
162. Expert Group on Climate Obligations of Enterprises, supra note 156, at
212.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 187–92.
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of natural gas.166 The commentary surrounding this principle notes that exploration for new reserves of oil and gas
beyond proven reserves are “fairly likely to become stranded
assets,”167 and, therefore, investors should be made aware of
the risks through disclosures by these companies.
The authors of the Enterprise Principles acknowledge that
their view of the legal obligations of enterprises and investors may be aspirational, but they also acknowledge that case
law will likely progress in their favor as the threat of climate
change materializes.168 Both the Oxford-Martin and Enterprise Principles couch their legal obligations in the context
of the Paris Agreement. As a result, it is useful to determine
whether the Paris Agreement and its provisions can provide
the necessary incentive for investors to make climate risks a
mainstream part of their investment decision-making.

III. The Paris Agreement and Institutional
Investors
A.

The Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement and its related COP decision concluded
at the end of 2015.169 The Agreement itself is a treaty between
Parties, imposing some binding legal obligations, but many
of the substantive provisions are collective ones.170 It adopts
a new “bottom-up” approach to global climate regulation,171
and relies on quasi-voluntary, nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”) from countries to reduce their GHG emissions. Because powerful countries such as the United States,
India, and China did not want their obligations under the
Paris Agreement to be tied to their respective NDCs, NDCs
do not impose any legally binding obligations on emission
caps or associated targets.172 The Agreement includes ambitious long-term temperature goals of holding any increase in
the global average temperature to “well below 2°C”—with an
aspirational goal of pursuing efforts to limit that increase to
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.173 In the same paragraph,
the Agreement aims to make finance flows consistent with
a pathway to lower GHG emissions and climate-resilient
development.174 There are, however, no obligations for Parties to ensure that their NDCs collectively meet the agreed
long-term temperature goal. In addition, the provision on
financial flows is a collective one, employing hortatory lan166. Id. at 188.
167. Expert Group on Climate Obligations of Enterprises, supra note 156, at
188.
168. Id. at 33–39.
169. Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php.
170. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 Rev. Eur.
Comp. & Int’l Envtl. L. 142, 145 (2016).
171. Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement:
Interpretation Possibilities and Underlying Politics, Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 493, 495
(2016).
172. Id., at 499.
173. UNFCCC, Adoption of The Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/ Rev. 1,
Article 2(1)(a) (Dec. 12, 2015).
174. Id. at Art. 2(1)(c).
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guage.175 The Agreement does contain provisions for global
stocktaking once every five years to assess progress, and sets
an expectation that NDCs will demonstrate progress over
time.176 The level of progressive ambition in NDCs, however,
is left entirely up to the discretion of each State.177
Gerrard has pointed to the importance of Article 4(1) as a
collective obligation to reach net zero emissions by mid-century.178 Article 4(1) states that parties are to achieve a balance
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks by mid-century.179 Gerrard notes that in order to
achieve that balance, emissions of GHGs from fossil fuels
need to end by mid-century.180 Bodansky has also noted that
Article 4(1), combined with the long-term temperature goals,
can send a strong signal to businesses that governments are
serious about ending fossil fuel emissions.181 Levin, Morgan,
and Song note that where the text reads a “balance” between
sources and sinks, this should be interpreted as seeking to
cancel out anthropogenic GHG emissions through sinks.182
They also note that the mid-century date is more ambitious
than previous language which referred to “by 2100.”183 The
provision does not, however, include a date when global
emissions must peak and then start decreasing, an annual
rate of decline, or the date when fossil fuel use should end.184
Burleson notes that the five yearly global stocktakes and
robust transparency mechanism in the Agreement have, in
part, signaled “that markets (Article 6) are a viable implementation approach” to low-carbon transition.185 The global
stocktakes are to consider progress toward the achievement
of the net zero goal in Article 14.186 Bodle notes that the
language about finance flows also has the potential to send
a strong signal to the private sector for them to re-assess and
redirect their investments.187 They also note, however, that
175. Id.
176. Id. at Art. 14(1) and 3.
177. Rajamani, supra note 171, at 495.
178. Michael
Gerrard,
Legal
Implications
of
the
Paris
Agreement for Fossil Fuels, Climate Law Blog (Dec. 19, 2015),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2015/12/19/
legal-implications-of-the-paris-agreement-for-fossil-fuels/.
179. UNFCCC, Adoption of The Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev. 1,
4(1) (Dec. 12, 2015).
180. Gerrard, supra note 177.
181. See Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope? 110 J.
Int’l L. 288, 303–04 (2016).
182. Kelly Levin et al., INSIDER: Understanding the Paris Agreement’s Long-Term
Goal to Limit Global Warming, World Res. Inst. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.
wri.org/blog/2015/12/insider-understanding-paris-agreement%E2%80%99slong-term-goal-limit-global-warming [https://perma.cc/7GXQ-G643].
183. Id.
184. See Daniel Tanuro, Specter of Geoengineering Haunts Paris Climate Deal,
Climate & Capitalism (Jan. 25, 2016), http://climateandcapitalism.
com/2016/01/25/the-specter-of-geoengineering-haunts-the-paris-climateagreement/ [https://perma.cc/25PE-2UQY].
185. Elizabeth Burleson, Paris Agreement and Consensus to Address Climate Challenge, Am. Soc’y Int’l L. (Mar. 29, 2016) https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/8/paris-agreement-and-consensus-address-climate-challenge
[https://perma.cc/Q372-CYU8].
186. Mukul Sanwal, The Paris Climate: A New Global Vision, Challenges of the Urban
Transition Remain and Negotiations Continue, India Env’t Portal (Feb. 23,
2016), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/424852/the-parisclimate-a-new-global-vision-challenges-of-the-urban-transition-remain-andnegotiations-continue/ [https://perma.cc/2P3A-YC8T].
187. Ralph Bodle et al., Umwelt Bundesamt, The Paris Agreement: Analysis,
Assessment and Outlook 13–14 (Jan. 28, 2016), http://ecologic.eu/sites/
files/event/2016/ecologic_institute_2016_paris_agreement_assessment.pdf.
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stronger language to remove fossil fuel subsidies, institute a
price on carbon, and mainstream enabling environments did
not make its way into the final agreement.188 The February
2015 Geneva Text, which remained the official negotiating
text during the majority of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (“ADP”) negotiations leading up to the Paris COP, contained a provision
whereby reductions had to be consistent with carbon neutrality or net zero emissions and full de-carbonization by
2050.189 It also included language referring explicitly to a
global emissions budget divided between all of the Parties
to limit warming to below a 1.5° C increase. By the ADP
negotiations in September 2015, language regarding a global
emissions budget had been determined not to be suitable for
inclusion in the Paris Agreement.190
Although there was support during the negotiations leading up to the Paris COP to include a long-term de-carbonization goal on the basis of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) net zero emissions target, fossil
fuel producing countries in particular did not want to include
such a carbon-focused goal in the Agreement.191 By early
December, language on a peaking date had been watered
down to “as soon as possible. In addition, only optional language remained on percentage reductions, achieving a zero
global emissions goal between 2060-2080, and softer language on an equitable distribution of a global carbon budget.192 The latter provisions simply did not make their way
into the final Agreement. Agreeing on a global emissions
budget, and the division of that budget between Parties, was
politically unfeasible. In addition, negotiating Parties could
not agree on specific percentage reductions over time,193 and
so the Agreement provides only the vague provision that
emissions will peak “as soon as possible,” while giving some
latitude to developing countries.194
The Agreement does introduce a new mechanism that can
be used by states on a voluntary basis and can also include
the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes
(“ITMOs”). ITMOs are a new mitigation crediting mechanism that can be used by both developed and developing
countries to buy and sell credits and apply them towards
achievement of their NDCs. ITMOs can contribute to a
State’s efforts to mitigate its NDC, but cannot be doublecounted by two countries.195 It is important to note that
Parties are not obligated to use this mechanism. In addition,
188. Id.
189. FCCC/ADP/2015/1 Article D.17.2 Option (a).
190. Officially Part 3 was described as “[p]rovisions whose placement requires further clarity among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or the draft decision.” Co-Chairs’ Tool: A Non-Paper Illustrating Possible Elements of the
Paris Package, Part Three, D. Mitigation Article 6 Option 3, provided at ADP
2.10.
191. Bodansky, supra note 170, at 303.
192. ‘Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. Work of the
ADP Contact Group incorporating bridging proposals by the Co-Facilitators’
Version 4 December 2015 @ 10:00’ at Art. 3.
193. Raymond Clemencon, The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal
Failure or Historic Breakthrough?, 25 J. Eɴᴠ’ᴛ & Dᴇᴠ. 9 (2016).
194. Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, Art. 4(1).
195. Id. at Art. 6(2)–(4).
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the language used in the Agreement does not actually create a market or a price for carbon, but merely acknowledges
that states may do so themselves.196 Article 6(8) also specifically recognizes the importance of nonmarket mechanisms
in enhancing private sector participation in the implementation of programs designed to lower NDCs.197 Presumably,
these include renewable energy policies and carbon regulation, although these are not explicitly mentioned in the
Agreement.

B.

The Accompanying COP Decision

The Paris Agreement is silent on carbon pricing, subsidies,
and enabling environments.198 Instead, these figure in the
accompanying COP decision. Nonstate actors themselves
are barely mentioned in the Paris Agreement at all, despite
ambitious hopes that they could be included or actually sign
the Agreement.199 The Agreement does establish a voluntary mechanism designed to contribute to mitigation efforts
under Article 6(4).200 While this mechanism is reserved for
use by the Parties, it is intended to incentivize and facilitate
participation in mitigation efforts by private entities which
Parties authorize to participate.
The COP decision adopting the Paris Agreement provides a number of voluntary mechanisms available to private
actors to encourage mitigation efforts, particularly in Section IV. The Non-State Actor Zone provides a registration
mechanism for non-Party stakeholders’ climate actions.201
This section also anticipates that regular opportunities will
be provided for non-Party stakeholders to participate in the
technical examination process on mitigation and aims to
establish a high-level event between 2016 and 2020 that will
encourage new or strengthened voluntary initiatives arising
from the technical examination process.202 Post-2020, Section V invites the private sector to scale up efforts to reduce
emissions, support actions to reduce emissions (presumably
by governments and NGOs), and to register those efforts in
the Non-State Actor Zone.203 The COP decision also “recognizes” the importance of incentives for emissions reductions
and specifically mentions domestic policies such as carbon
pricing.204 This is the only section where carbon pricing
explicitly appears.

196. See Steve Zwick, The Road from Paris: Green Lights, Speed Bumps, and the Future of Carbon Markets, Ecosystem Marketplace (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.
ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/green-lights-and-speed-bumps-on-roadto-markets-under-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/PW3T-W9H2].
197. UNFCCC, Adoption of The Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/ Rev. 1,
Art. 6(8) (Dec. 12, 2015).
198. Bodle, supra note 187, at 13.
199. See Bodansky, supra note 181, at 315.
200. Id. at 303–04.
201. Conference of the Parties, Framework Convention on Climate Change ¶ 118,
Dec. 12, 2015.
202. Id. at ¶ 110.
203. Id. at ¶ 135.
204. Id. at ¶ 137.
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Non-State Actor Activities

The Paris Agreement is also historic because it encourages
commitments from nonstate actors, and over 1,200 stakeholders signed the Paris Pledge of Action.205 Efforts to include
nonstate actors in the Paris Agreement process began as early
as 2011, when the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) Secretariat launched the
Momentum for Change campaign, highlighting actions by
nonstate actors around the globe.206 By 2015, the Compact
for Mayors had 428 cities signed up to climate pledges.207
The Lima-Paris Action Agenda (“LPAA”) encourages nonstate actors to contribute to lowering State-based NDCs, and
Hale notes that nonstate actors are now included as a core
element of climate governance through these mechanisms.208
Chan characterizes the pre-2020 action agenda as arguably
“the most comprehensive framework of non-State engagement” in climate governance.209 Hale also notes that the
new climate governance regime initiated by the Paris Agreement provides an “inflection point” for nonstate actor inclusion.210 Businesses themselves characterized the LPAA as an
opportunity to “showcase best practice and replicate successful approaches” to mitigation and climate resilience.211 The
Technical Examination Processes under the pre-2020 work
stream can provide a “rare and crucial interface between the
transnational and multinational spheres of governance” on
climate change.212
In addition to the formal negotiations taking place at the
Paris COP, a number of sub-national and nonstate initiatives
were simultaneously taking place. Thousands of concerned
members of the global community came to Paris and participated in “side events,” and many new initiatives involving
nonstate actors were launched213. In addition to the NonState Actor Zone, Initiative Cleantech was launched by President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and
President Francois Hollande, along with Bill Gates.214 The
initiative is designed to invest billions of dollars into clean
205. Kenneth W. Abbott, Orchestrating Experimentation in Non-State Environmental
Commitments, 26 Envtl. Pols. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 11–12),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2851650.
206. Sander Chan et al., Aligning Transnational Climate Action with International
Climate Governance: The Road from Paris, 25 Rev. of Eur., Comp., & Int’l
Envtl. L. 238, 241 (2016).
207. Id.
208. See Global Climate Action: NAZCA, UNFCCC, http://climateaction.unfccc.int/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2017); see also Thomas Hale, “All Hands on Deck”:
The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action, 16 Glob. Envtl. Pols. 12,
13–14 (2016).
209. Chan et al., supra note 206, at 242.
210. Hale, supra note 208, at 13.
211. We Mean Business, Shaping a catalytic Paris Agreement, The Business
Brief 2 (2015), http://www.wemeanbusinesscoaslition.org/sites/default/files/
Business-Brief_Web.pdf.
212. Chan et al., supra note 206, at 242.
213. See, e.g., Meetings, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (Mar. 16, 2018 6:40 PM), http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_
may_2017/items/10083.php.
214. Valerie Volcovici & Emmanuel Jarry, Microsoft’s Gates to Start Multi-BillionDollar Clean Tech Initiative, Reuters (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.reuters.
com/article/climatechange-summit-technology/update-1-microsofts-gates-tostart-multi-billion-dollar-clean-tech-initiative-idUSL1N13M0XG20151127.
The Gates Foundation recently divested its holdings in BP. See Damian Carrington, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Divests Entire Holding in BP, The
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energy development and research.215 Over twenty states and
companies joined the Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 Initiative
at the Paris COP,216 and Mission Innovation was launched at
Paris to reinvigorate and accelerate state and non-state efforts
toward affordable global clean energy innovation.217 PostParis COP, in November 2016, ten oil and gas companies
formed the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, which seeks to
show sector leadership in response to climate change.218
The lack of detail in national obligations and the largely
voluntary mechanisms established for nonstate parties is
arguably a weak signal to markets that governments are
serious about reducing their carbon emissions.219 Most academics agree that the Paris Agreement sets a clear political narrative, or, “direction of travel,” but relies on largely
procedural techniques of disclosure to achieve its net zero
emissions and temperature goals.220 Despite the historic
opportunities for participation that the Paris Agreement has
provided nonstate actors, it is permissive, not mandatory, and
it is unclear whether recalcitrant companies, including some
carbon-major companies, will react proactively to the new
regime.221 It may then be risk management that can spur on
the mainstreaming of climate risk into investment portfolios.

IV.

Risk Management

The Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures has stated
that climate change constitutes one of the most significant
but misunderstood risks facing firms today.222 Managing
climate change impacts has transitioned from a purely ethical or moral consideration to the recognition of the material
risks and opportunities that climate change poses to firms.223
These risks have become so material that Dhar and Barker
note that consideration of them has reached an “inflection
point” for mainstream institutional investors, whose main
interests are managing risk and return.224 They note that the
momentum that has been building around risk management,
issues of asset valuation, and enhanced disclosure has now
reached a “tipping point” where it is no longer only activist
investors who are concerned about climate change.225 While
the Paris Agreement has provided a signal to the market on
the global approach to climate change, it is the magnitude
of existing and potential risks and opportunities that has
captured the attention of mainstream investors, and spurred
them to advocate for more and better disclosure on climate
Guardian (May 12, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/
may/12/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation-divests-entire-holding-in-bp.
215. Volcovici & Jarry, supra note 214.
216. The World Bank, Zero Routine Flaring by 2030, http://www.worldbank.org/
en/programs/zero-routine-flaring-by-2030#1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
217. Fact Sheet: Mission Innovation, The White House (Nov. 29, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/29/
fact-sheet-mission-innovation.
218. See Oil & Gas Climate Initiative, www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com (last
visited Mar. 16, 2018).
219. See Bodle, supra note 187, at 26.
220. Id. at 2; Rajamani, supra note 171, at 496; Burleson, supra note 185, at 13.
221. See Hale, supra note 208, at 17.
222. Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, supra note 150, at ii.
223. Dhar & Barker, supra note 97, at 1.
224. See id. at 2.
225. See id. at 3.
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change. Barker and Girgis note that there is growing recognition that the impacts from climate change can pose
“material financial risks and opportunities - of such breadth
and significance that failure to properly disclose them to the
market warrants regulatory intervention.”226 This has led to
much broader financial market recognition of the importance of evaluating the risks of climate change as a material
driver of financial risk.227
Despite the magnitude of these risks, Ceres has found that
most companies do not disclose company-specific material
information about climate change, and they are not quantifying risks or measuring past impacts.228 This lack of
decision-useful information is spurring investors and regulators to require more and better climate-related disclosures.
Failure to comply could violate corporate disclosure laws, as
highlighted by the investigations of both ExxonMobil and
Peabody in 2015.229 In the context of carbon-major companies, Ceres found that the decline in conventional oil fields
has led to the exploitation of high-cost and more carbonintensive and unconventional exploration projects.230 As a
result, carbon-major companies are investing extensively in
exploration and development of new reserves, but for less
return.231 Investors have responded by seeking more specific low-carbon assessments of these companies’ activities,
including capital expenditure plans for new reserves, rates
of return, payback periods, alternative uses of capital and
a discussion of the risks to unproved reserves from pricing,
reduced subsidies, or reduced demand.232 Although the Ceres
letter acknowledges that some companies are now stress-testing their climate change strategies against IEA scenarios, it
also notes that these same companies are not disclosing their
stress-testing parameters.233 More and better disclosure is
being demanded as a consequence of institutional investors’
recognition that climate-related risks could directly affect the
profitability and valuation of these companies.234
The Asset Owners Disposal Project (“AODP”) characterizes risk management by how well asset owners manage
climate-related risks at the portfolio level and how they drive
fund managers to manage climate change risk at the fund
level.235 The AODP concludes that the investment world is
a long way away from the transparency and risk manage226. Sarah Barker & Maged Girgis, MinterEllison, A New Cop on the
Beat–Heightened Expectations for Corporate Sustainability Governance and Disclosure, 3 (June 2016), http://forms.minterellison.com/
files/uploads/documents/email%20marketing/final%20alert%20-%20corporate%20sustainability%20governance%20and%20disclosure.pdf.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Jim Coburn & Jackie Cook, Cool Response: The SEC & Corporate Climate
Change Reporting, Ceres 5 (Feb. 2014), https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/
files/reports/2017-03/Ceres_SECguidance-append_020414_web.pdf.
229. See Suzanne Goldenberg, ExxonMobil Under Investigation Over Claim It Lied
About Climate Change Risks, The Guardian (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/05/exxonmobil-investigation-climate-change-peabody (discussing legal accusations arising from potentially
insufficient or inaccurate disclosure by ExxonMobil and Peabody Energy).
230. Letter from Ceres to Hon. Mary Jo White, supra note 110, at 2.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 3.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 4.
235. Asset Owners Disclosure Project, supra at note 132, at 15.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392507

18

GEORGE WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

ment practices that are required to avoid a “carbon crash.”236
Far too few funds incentivize their internal and external
agents to manage climate change risk.237 Significant policy
and regulatory work in enhancing duties to disclose material
risk—particularly duties to manage material climate-related
risks—remain. Harper Ho notes that while risk can be both
positive and negative, if corporate boards are able to appreciate risk-related activism as enhancing firm value, they will be
more receptive to governance changes, enhanced disclosure,
and even sustainability practices.238 She cites extensive literature connecting strong monitoring and management of risk
and ESG factors to lower costs of capital and cheaper debt
financing and, therefore, better financial health of firms.239
The Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures has recommended scenario-based disclosures, which measure a firm’s
risk against a 2˚C scenario, including capital allocations,
costs, and revenues of their strategies.240

Conclusion
The Paris Agreement has clearly motivated both nonstate
actor initiatives at the global level and increased shareholder
activism at conventional energy companies. Recent shareholder resolutions seem to primarily be concerned with
ensuring increased and better disclosure by these companies,
but also to specifically include portfolio resilience to future
energy scenarios. It will be important to analyze how energy
companies frame this resilience issue in their future disclosures. In pre-2030 energy scenarios, carbon disclosures may
not reference the issue of stranded assets. However, two later
dates are important: post-2030 energy scenarios, once proved
reserves are exhausted, as well as post-2050, which is the
global goal in the Paris Agreement to achieve net zero emissions. The issue of stranded assets should figure prominently
in energy companies’ disclosures around long-term investments in production and exploration which would become
productive near these future dates. Due to the longer production periods and, therefore, lead-in times for new, unconventional oil and gas resources, decisions about post-2030
investments must be made now by carbon-major firms.241 As
a result, investors should be concerned about accessing and
assessing rigorous capital expenditure decisions in the shortterm for future projects.242
Despite increased activity by institutional investors, the
issue of stranded assets remains a sensitive one for carbonmajor companies. While management at Royal Dutch Shell
has accepted the increased disclosures requested by institutional investors, their response to the concern of stranded
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id.
238. Harper Ho, supra note 11, at 662.
239. Id. at 665–66.
240. Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, supra note 150, at
31–32.
241. See Carbon Tracker Initiative, Responding to Shell: An Analytical
Perspective 45–46 (July 12, 2014) http://www.carbontracker.org/report/
responding-to-shell-an-analytical-perspective.
242. Id. at 46.
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assets was that it “ignores the realities of our industry.”243
The company instead chose to focus on the continued global
demand for fossil fuels.244
It remains unclear how investors will react to the Paris
Agreement in the future, but their reaction is likely to be
heavily influenced by how governments choose to implement
the Agreement in terms of national policy and regulation.
While the Agreement itself does not include specific reduction percentages or a division of a global emissions budget, it
does establish a clear global intention that “business as usual”
on climate change cannot continue. Thus, the Agreement
takes a permissive approach to investment and market initiatives on climate change. The modalities and specifics of the
committees and mechanisms established in the Agreement
will be fleshed out over the next few years. In the interim,
it is clear that investors’ action on climate change will likely
continue to be driven by concerns of risk. While the permissive approach set forth in the Paris Agreement may be attractive to investors who are already active on climate change
issues, it may not do much to persuade investors who focus
mainly on profitability.
Although awareness of climate change has increased
among institutional investors in the past few years, there has,
to date, been limited action on the ground to mainstream climate change into investment strategies until very recently.245
The sustainable investing movement has only had “modest, remedial” influence on the financial sector.246 Recent
activity by institutional investors is, however, encouraging.
Both private companies and regulators are responding to
investor demands for better and more effective disclosures
from institutional investors. In late 2017, several guidance
documents were made available to investors (largely through
initiatives from the NGO ClientEarth), including a framework for pension fund action on climate change published
by the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association in collaboration with ClientEarth, as well as a series of publications
by ClientEarth called ‘Risky Business,’ analyzing legal risks
to auditors, direct benefit pension actuaries and direct benefit investment consultants due to climate change.247 These
documents highlight both the potential legal liability of
investment actors due to climate change, as well as provide
a series of recommendations for these entities to take action
on climate change (including requiring further disclosure by
asset managers and corporate boards, seeking out low-carbon
243. Jorma Ollila & Ben Van Beurden, Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C. Annual
General Meeting 8 (2015), http://www.shell.com/investors/retail-shareholder-information/annual-general-meeting/_jcr_content/par/expandablelist/
expandablesection.stream/1445265424018/567579655ef2e76ee63572721f
d2bda8eca315088c9a4fff23d7dd8797053345/2015-agm-speech-chairmanceo.pdf.
244. See id.
245. See Kierman, supra note 111, at 129; Fulton & Kahn, supra note 58, at 177.
246. Richardson, supra note 8, at 226.
247. Pensions & Lifetime Savings Ass’n, More Light, Less Heat: A framework for Pension Fund Action on Climate Change (2017), https://
www.plsa.co.uk/Policy-and-Research-Document-library-More-light-lessheat; see also Client Earth, Risky Business Climate Change and
Professional Liability for DB Pension Actuaries (2017); ClientEarth, Risky Business Climate Change and Professional Liability for DB Investment Consultants (2017) https://www.clientearth.org/
new-reports-bring-light-climate-liability-risks-facing-pensions-advisers/
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investment options, and providing much needed guidance
to investors and investment actors). In January 2018,—in
response to the 2017 Law Commission’s Report on Pensions
Funds and Social Investment—the Department of Works
and Pensions issued what has been called a ‘landmark’ policy
reform proposal that would require UK pension schemes to
report on climate risk where it poses financially material risks
to pension funds.248 In addition, an European Union HighLevel Expert Group on Sustainable Finance issued their
final report on ‘greener’ approaches EU financial practices—
including in relation to climate change.
A recent class action suit launched in 2016 by the investors
in Exxon Mobil highlights a new turn in investor action on
climate change. There, a group of investors launched a suit
against Exxon Mobil for producing misleading information
to its investors concerning the value and profitability of its
reserve assets. 249 The suit alleges that the company misrepresented in their corporate documents the methods used to
value its reserves, leading to a de-booking of nearly 20% of
its proved reserves in 2017, and a significant loss to investors.250 It remains to be seen whether similar investor-based
suits will follow.
However, it should be noted that there is an assumption
that more and better disclosures on climate change risks will,
by itself, create market incentives that will motivate investors
to promote and encourage climate change mitigation.251 In
addition, the profitability barrier persists. Namely, difficulties exist in proving a causal relationship between sustainability and financial returns,252 and institutional investors
continue only to be concerned with climate change when
it has short-term or immediate impacts on assets and performance.253 Further, substantial obstacles still remain for
institutional investors interested in mainstreaming climate
change into their investment strategies. These include the
perception that greater involvement in governance will not
increase performance and may be incompatible with fiduciary duties. In particular, fund managers may be concerned
that more intensive relationships with corporate boards may
expose them to insider trading allegations. Proactive engagement with management, particularly on investment trajectories, may create a concern among investment managers that
248. Dep’t for Works & Pensions, Pension Funds and Social Investment:
The Government’s Interim Response (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pension-funds-and-social-investment-interim-response; see
also ClientEarth, UK Pensions Law Reform will Sweep Climate Confusion Off
the Table”, (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.clientearth.org/pensions-law-reformwill-sweep-climate-confusion-off-the-table-environmental-lawyers/.
249. Compl. Ramirez v. ExxonMobil, No. 3:16-VC-3111 (N. Dist. Tex. Nov. 7,
2016).
250. Id. at 9–10
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they will be exposed to insider information from boards of
trustees. In addition, there is a lack of credible, long-term
research linking environmental performance with financial
performance.254 According to Kierman, investors still need
an investment case in order to take climate change more seriously, as well as better, company-specific analytics to enable
them to assess climate risks.255 Harper Ho’s analysis, however, points to a much stronger correlation between ESG factors and better firm performance.256 This analysis, combined
with emerging recommendations produced by industry and
NGOs, also provide an incentive to institutional investors to
take climate risk seriously, and also provides concrete actionplans to facilitate more and better action by investors.
Despite these recent movements, several barriers to increasing the impact of the sustainable investing movement need to
be addressed. They include informational barriers as well as
the short-term elements included in fiduciary duties. There
are also larger systemic issues within the market itself, such as
short-term performance metrics and the inability of markets
to identify and deal with systemic risks. Richardson notes
that corporate governance rules dissuade active shareholders.257 In his view, these institutional and economic barriers
are “entrenched,” and the core legal rules on fiduciary duties
do nothing to dismantle these barriers.258 He also notes that,
although activity by institutional investors is important,
ultimately, investors are not price-makers.259 It is, in fact,
demand in the market that will dictate the cost of capital
to investors, and, ultimately, the value of the firm.260 Continued demand in the market for fossil fuels is precisely the
issue that Royal Dutch Shell has highlighted when dismissing the concerns about stranded assets.261 Market demand
will ultimately depend on changes in national and international regulation on emissions and the scaling-up of clean
energy sources. While institutional investors are a necessary
part of the investment shift to clean energy, investor activity
must be combined with market reforms to reduce demand in
the market for fossil fuels.
The conservative nature of risk regulation may pose
another systemic barrier to investor activities on climate
change.262 Heyvaert notes that climate change demands
large-scale, systemic change, but the nature of risk regulation means that it tends toward stabilization and therefore
could hinder climate change regulation efforts.263 Climate
change poses a twofold challenge: the transition to a low-car254. See Tom Hadden, Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors? Some Problems from an International Perspective, in Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 100 (Theodor Baums et al., eds. 2011); Kierman, supra
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bon economy must be swift if we are to meet the long-term
temperature goals in the Paris Agreement, yet the necessary
speed of such a transition could destabilize existing market
performance metrics and general fiscal stability. The FSB
has recently highlighted inherent destabilization risks in the
transition to a low-carbon economy, particularly if stranded
assets are re-priced in a short time frame.264
As a result, the discourse on climate change by institutional investors remains predominantly economics-centered
and risk-driven.265 However, the increasing concern over the
magnitude of climate-related risks has managed to capture
the attention of mainstream institutional investors. This
risk-driven narrative, combined with the impetus of the Paris
Agreement as well as new and useful guidance, action plans
and legal principles targeted towards investors, may provide
a pathway for institutional investors to pressure companies
into a longer-term and more rigorous analysis of their climate
change strategies.
Systemic barriers to investor activity on climate change
must be challenged and reformed if the Paris Agreement is
to have the desired effect. This could be achieved if governments are ambitious in translating the roadmap established
in the Paris Agreement into national and international regu-
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latory reform. Reform of fiduciary duties to include longterm perspectives that incorporate sustainability is an urgent
need.266 Increased awareness of the magnitude of climaterelated risks may provide the very impetus needed for such
a reform, and reconsideration, of fiduciary duties in the
Anthropocene. In addition, regulators should improve their
ability to identify systemic risks within the market, such as
stranded assets. Emerging legal principles such as the Enterprise Principles, provide both companies and investors with
a model to future-proof their business and investment strategies for a transition towards a net-zero economy. The new
FSB initiative to coalesce disclosure initiatives for the benefit
of investors is a good start. The fact that the Governor of the
Bank of England is now discussing inherent fiscal stability
risks due to climate change, together with the new global
roadmap set out in the Paris Agreement, mark important
turning points that could usher in a new era of risk regulation
that should help institutional investors receive risk-centered
and decision-useful information on climate change, and aid
them in making more informed investment decisions regarding climate change.267
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